As one of the preconditions of entry into the eurozone, potential entrants are required to adopt successfully the framework of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II for a minimum of two years. ERM II stipulates the maintenance of a stable exchange-rate peg vis-à-vis the euro, typically with a fl uctuation margin no greater than +/-15%. 1 Notably, the ERM II participants are mostly made up of smaller new EU member states.
2 Some of the larger economies -such as the United Kingdom, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary -have not entered ERM II. While their individual circumstances and motivations vary, this paper provides a unifying framework for analysing the incentives to enter ERM II as a decision distinct from the goal of adopting the euro. Utilising a comparative study of two recent EU entrants and aspirants for full EMU membership -the Czech Republic and Hungary -this paper highlights the potential pitfalls in the transition to EMU, specifi cally with respect to the required two year participation in ERM II.
Although not offi cially part of ERM II, Hungary had been implementing an exchange-rate regime consistent with this framework until February 2008 when, in light of high market volatility, the decision was taken to offi cially fl oat the currency. The Hungarian government originally aimed to adopt the euro as soon as possible, setting 2010 as its preferred target date, but was forced to abandon this plan in 2006. The country has been experiencing problems in meeting the convergence criteria, and the date for eurozone accession remains open.
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This paper highlights that the EMU transition process itself can pose challenges to individual accession countries and draws policy implications for ERM II. Differences in fi nancial market development and international liabilities underscore the risks and benefi ts of ERM II, and may lead to confl ict between short and long-term policy objectives.
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The Czech Republic has not entered the ERM II stage of accession to the eurozone to date, and in 2006 both the government and the central bank retracted their offi cial target of 2010 for the adoption of the euro without announcing a new plan. This is despite the Czech Republic's better performance in terms of the convergence criteria. As Table 1 shows, Hungary has not met any of the convergence criteria, while the Czech Republic falls short only marginally. The infl ation rate exceeds the eurozone benchmark for 2008, but this development has been affected by a substantial increase in indirect taxes and administered prices, as well as a rise in food prices. Given the country's historically low infl ation rates and high degree of infl ation aversion, it is not surprising that the European Commission forecasts a 3.1% annual infl ation rate for 2009 and 2.7% for 2010.
Nevertheless, both the Czech government and central bank appear quite weary (and rightly so) of entering the interim ERM II phase ahead of EMU membership. The Governor of the Czech National Bank (CNB) has argued that "… EMS/ERM is, by its nature, a regime of the past, not of the present nor the future. … it does not refl ect the increased globalization of the fi nancial fl ows and the current skeptical view of the soft exchange-rate regimes". they exhibited signifi cant divergence in their choice of economic policy both historically and during the transition period of the 1990s. Different paths of public debt and infl ation had signifi cant implications for the sources of investment fi nancing.
The choice of exchange-rate regime has closely paralleled the development of these underlying factors. As external sources of fi nancing gained in importance in Hungary after a period of infl ation persistence, so did the incentives for enhancing credibility through a stable and predictable exchange-rate. The Czech government, on the other hand, was relatively free of such constraints, given the low level of public and private sector fi nancing needs and a solid domestic investor base. Accordingly, the Czech Republic has had a preference for an exchange regime with a relatively high degree of fl exibility and has been implementing a managed fl oat since May 1997. Hungary on the other hand applied de facto crawling bands for most of the 1990s and a preannounced crawling band around the euro since 1999. The fl uctuation band was originally a narrow +/-2.25% and was later widened to +/-15% around the central parity in 2001. Until then Hungary had also maintained restrictions on non-resident short-term capital infl ows in order to enhance the central bank's ability to maintain the narrow band.
In February 2008, Hungary was forced to abandon its ERM II mimicking exchange-rate regime and let the currency fl oat. The decision came as a result of exchangerate pressure refl ecting on the country's economic imbalances, but also at least partly a manifestation of the challenges of maintaining a soft exchange-rate peg in globalised fi nancial markets and their associated high degree of volatility.
A Review of Literature on Exchange-rate Regime Choice
Among the most prominent normative theories of regime choice is the Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) framework developed by Mundell 4 and McKinnon. 5 The OCA stream of research determines the optimality of a monetary union based on a set of criteria such as trade links, labour mobility, enhancement of monetary policy credibility, fi scal transfers, and the synchronisation of shocks across member states.
Optimal regime choice has also been linked to the source of the economic shocks, real or nominal, and the degree of capital mobility. Following Mundell 6 and Fleming, 7 the main recommendations on regime choice included adopting a fl oating regime if real shocks prevail, while a fi xed regime should be preferable under nominal shocks. At the same time, a currency peg involves a trade-off between monetary independence and free capital mobility.
Later Frankel and Rose 8 pointed towards the endogeneity of OCAs, or the fact that countries may become optimal candidates for a monetary union ex post, after the implementation of a common monetary regime, even if they do not qualify ex ante. The reason is that the currency union is likely to enhance trade and the correlation of shocks in member states.
In practice exchange-rate regimes exhibit a large degree of heterogeneity even within the same offi cial category. Fixed exchange-rates get realigned frequently or fl uctuate in a relatively wide band, while some fl oats behave more like a peg. This observation led to a thorough re-examination of exchange-rate regime classifi cations, and differentiation between de jure and de facto regimes. The de jure, offi cial or self-declared, regime characterisation is represented primarily by the classifi cation system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Reinhart and Rogoff 9 and Levy-Yeyati and 
